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Abstract
Industrial systems of practical relevance can be often characterized in terms of discrete control
variables and real-valued physical variables, and can therefore be modeled as hybrid automata.
Unfortunately, continuity of the physical behaviour over time, or triangular constraints, must often
be assumed, which yield an undecidable class of hybrid automata.
In this paper, we propose a technique for bounded reachability of linear hybrid automata, based
on the reduction of a bounded reachability problem to a MathSAT problem, i.e. satisﬁability
of a boolean combination of propositional variables and mathematical constraints. The MathSAT
solver can be used to check the existence (or absence) of paths of bounded length.
The approach is very similar in spirit to SAT-based bounded model checking; furthermore, the
ability to reason directly about real variables gives computational leverage over discretization-
based methods. Despite the undecidability of the general problem, the proposed method is able to
provide valuable information on large designs of practical relevance.
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1 Introduction
Many systems and plants of industrial relevance (e.g., engines, turbines) are
deﬁned in terms of discrete control variables and physical real-valued variables
(e.g., speed, pressure), and can be naturally modeled as hybrid automata: de-
pending on a discrete state (e.g., “nominal”, “increasing”), diﬀerent equations
describe the behaviour of the physical variable (e.g., speed). Frequently, the
dynamics of physical variables is continuous: i.e., transitions from a discrete
state to another should not necessarily yield a discontinuity in the physical
dimension. For instance, in the transition from “increasing” to “decreasing”,
the velocity should not change its value (but only its derivative). Furthermore,
the evolution can depend on the comparison between the values of physical
variables. Unfortunately, either imposing continuity or allowing for compar-
isons between variables (also known as triangular constraints) result in a class
of hybrid automata where even reachability is undecidable [12]. Yet, it is very
important to be able to develop tools that allow to formally validate such
designs, that often implement critical functionalities (e.g., control systems for
avionics).
In this paper, we address the problem of verifying hybrid automata with
continuous variables and triangular constraints. We propose a formal veriﬁca-
tion method for bounded reachability. The approach is based on the encoding
of a bounded reachability problem into a MathSAT problem, i.e. the problem
of checking the satisﬁability of a boolean combination of propositional vari-
ables and mathematical constraints over real variables. The approach is made
practical by the use of the eﬃcient MathSAT solver [1], that extends and inte-
grates state-of-the-art techniques for propositional satisﬁability (SAT) with a
set of mathematical reasoners. The approach presented in this paper is largely
similar to bounded model checking [4], and enhances the method presented
in [3], limited to timed systems, to dealing with real variables with arbitrary
linear dynamics.
The proposed technique is clearly incomplete, and currently limited to the
case of linear dynamics. Despite these facts, however, it allows us to represent
and to analyze interesting systems from real-world applications [6,5], providing
useful information, especially oriented to debugging and goal-directed simula-
tion. An experimental analysis shows that our techniques is competitive with
state of the art veriﬁcation tools such as HyTech, and with methods based on
the discretization of real variables.
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Outline of the paper
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we illustrate
a motivating example for our approach; in Section 3 we give a short and
informal introduction to our model of hybrid systems; in Section 4 we give a
brief overview of SAT-based bounded model checking and we discuss in more
detail our encoding of hybrid systems into MathSAT; in Section 5 we discuss
some experiments, and ﬁnally in Section 6 and 7 we discuss related work and
draw some conclusions.
2 A Motivating Example: The Secondary Power Sys-
tem
Throughout the paper, we use a running example to motivate and illustrate the
main concepts we present. Speciﬁcally, we discuss the modeling and analysis of
a real-world safety-critical system, namely the Secondary Power System (SPS).
It is an industrial case study which has been and is being investigated within
ESACS (Enhanced Safety Analysis for Complex Systems), a European-Union-
sponsored project in the avionics sector, whose goal is to deﬁne a methodology
to improve the safety analysis practice for complex systems development [6,5].
The SPS drives the hydraulic and electrical utilities of an aircraft. It is an
example of safety-critical system with embedded hardware and software com-
ponents. The hardware subsystems comprise (electro)-mechanical components
(e.g., control valves, relays, shafts, gearboxes, freewheels) and electronic trans-
ducers (e.g., speed and pressure sensors), whereas the software component is
given by embedded controllers (SPS computers).
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Fig. 2. SPS: main engine automaton (ME)
The SPS drives the utilities of both the left and right hand side of the
aircraft. To ensure the basic safety requirement, i.e. no single failures shall
cause the total loss of the SPS utilities, the architecture of the system includes
two basic redundancies: there are two independent and perfectly symmetric
lines, whose purpose is to drive the left and the right hand side utilities,
respectively; for each side, the mechanical drive of the relevant utilities (normal
mode) is redounded by a pneumatic drive (cross-bleed mode) in case of failure
of one of the components in the mechanical line.
Figure 1 shows a simpliﬁed schematic view of the SPS. The SPS normal
operation consists in transmitting the mechanical power from the engines to
the relevant hydraulic and electrical generators. Speciﬁcally, the mechanical
power of the main engine (ME) is transmitted via the Power Take Oﬀ Shaft
(PTO) to a gearbox (GBX) which feeds the utilities. A component may fail
due to abnormal operational conditions or ruptures. As an example, ﬂame-
out and grippage are two possible failure modes of the main engine. To ensure
safety of in-ﬂight operation, in case of an engine failure the SPS computers au-
tomatically initiate a cross-bleed procedure consisting in driving the hydraulic
and electrical generators by means of an air turbine motor (ATSM), using
bled air from a valve (VALVE), which is in turn fed by the mechanical power
coming from the opposite engine. Correct functioning of the cross-bleed pro-
cedure is an example of one safety requirement of the SPS. Some experimental
results about this will be presented in Section 5.
3 Modeling Hybrid Automata
In this section we brieﬂy present and exemplify our model of hybrid systems.
The model is inspired by the linear and rectangular hybrid automata models
presented in [10,11]. Informally, a hybrid system can be seen as the parallel
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composition of a collection of hybrid automata, which can communicate ei-
ther by explicit synchronization on some channel, or implicitly by means of
shared variables. Each automaton models both discrete events (e.g., failure of
a component) and continuous activities of analog variables (e.g., time, com-
ponent speed). At any given instant of time, the state of a hybrid automaton
is deﬁned by a control location (discrete state) and the values of all the ana-
log variables (continuous state). The state can change either because of an
instantaneous discrete transition, which changes the control location and may
also aﬀect the values of the analog variables (e.g., re-initialization is possible)
or because of a time elapse (continuous) transition, which changes only the
values of the analog variables according to some speciﬁed law. Hybrid systems
can be seen as an extension of the timed systems model of [3], in which the
only analog variables are clocks. In the following, by elementary linear ex-
pression we mean an equality and/or (non-strict) inequality over linear terms
(i.e., linear combinations of real-valued variables with rational coeﬃcients).
Figure 2 and 3 depict two examples of hybrid automata, modeling the
main engine (ME) and the valve (VALVE) components of the SPS. A hybrid
automaton consists of the following components:
Locations A ﬁnite set of locations, encoding the discrete states of the hybrid
automaton. The automaton in Figure 2 has ﬁve locations, drawn as circles,
which model the discrete state of the ME of the SPS. Location no fail mod-
els the default behaviour of the engine; locations grippage and flameout
model two diﬀerent faulty states; locations speed sm4 and speed sm3 model
states in which the speed of the engine has the constant value sm4 and sm3.
Analog Variables A ﬁnite vector of real-valued data variables (w1, . . . , wn).
The sp me variable in Figure 2 encodes the speed of the ME. Clock variables
of [3] may be seen as a particular case of real-valued variables. Primed
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variables (e.g., sp me′) are used to denote the value of real-valued variables
after execution of a transition.
Initial and Invariant Conditions Every location of a hybrid automaton
may be declared as initial (meaning that it is a legal initial state of the sys-
tem). Every location may be equipped with invariants on the real-valued
variables, expressed by means of a set of elementary linear expressions
{ψ1, ..., ψh} over the variables w1, . . . , wn. Location no fail is the initial
location of the ME automaton (Figure 2), and is equipped with an invari-
ant enforcing the sp me variable to stay between the constant values sm1
and sm2. The invariant in location speed sm3 forces sp me to assume con-
stantly the value sm3.
Channels A ﬁnite set of channels is used for discrete communication between
automata. A channel c may be used as an input (notation c?) or an output
(notation c!) channel for synchronizing diﬀerent automata. For instance,
the pressure valve automaton of Figure 3 uses two diﬀerent input channels
called open? and close?. The intended semantics is that the pressure valve
automaton awaits for incoming commands (requesting either opening of
closing of the valve) coming from the relevant SPS computer controller.
Transitions A ﬁnite set of discrete transitions encodes the discrete evolu-
tion of the automaton. Each transition (also called switch) has a source
and target location, and may be equipped with a set {γ1, ..., γk} of guards
(pre-conditions) and a set {θ1, ..., θm} of jump conditions (post-conditions)
on the real-valued variables. A guard is an elementary linear expression
over w1, . . . , wn; a jump condition is an elementary linear expression over
w1, . . . , wn, w
′
1, . . . , w
′
n. In Figure 2, the transition from flameout to speed sm3
has a guard sp me = sm3 and no jump condition. By convention, the
absence of jump conditions on a transition forces real-valued variables to
preserve their value (e.g., in the previous example sp me′ = sp me implic-
itly holds). Transitions may be equipped with one or more optional labels
denoting the channels on which the automaton must synchronize. For in-
stance, two transitions in Figure 3 are labeled with the input channels open?
and close?
Variable Dynamics Variable dynamics describe how the real-valued vari-
ables change in presence of a time elapse transition, and are expressed, for
each location, as a set {Ψ1, . . . ,Ψk} of elementary linear expressions over
w1, . . . , wn, w
′
1, . . . , w
′
n, As an example, in Figure 2 the sp me variable in lo-
cation grippage varies according to the law sp me′ = sp me−k1(∆t) (where
k1 is a constant), that is, the speed decreases linearly (proportionally to the
time delay) with ﬁrst derivative equal to k1. The expression ∆t, encoding
the time delay, will be explained in Section 4.2.
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The hybrid automata presented here do not fall into the rectangular automata
class described in [10], since re-initialization of variables is not enforced, and
triangular constraints are possible. As a consequence, even the problem of
reachability for this class of automata is undecidable [12].
4 Bounded Model Checking for Hybrid Systems
In this section we give a very short overview of SAT based model checking, and
we discuss the encoding of our model of hybrid systems, informally described
in Section 3, into MathSAT.
4.1 SAT Based Bounded Model Checking
Bounded Model Checking (BMC) is a recent approach to symbolic model
checking [4]. Given a Kripke structure M , and an LTL formula f , the idea
is to check whether f is true in M by looking for a counterexample (i.e., a
witness to the violation of f) that can be presented within a bound of k steps.
Given k, the problem is reduced to the satisﬁability of a propositional formula
[[M,¬f ]]k. For instance, for a property of the form f := Gp(s), where p(s) is
a boolean formula in the boolean variables s, then
[[M,¬f ]]k = I(s(0)) ∧
k∧
i=0
C(s(i)) ∧
k−1∧
i=0
R(s(i), s(i+1)) ∧
k∨
i=0
¬p(s(i)),
where I(s(0)) is a representation of the initial conditions, C(s(i)) is a representa-
tion of the invariant conditions at step i, and R(s(i), s(i+1)) is a representation
of the transition relation from step i to step i+ 1. If [[M,¬f ]]k is satisﬁable,
the propositional model provides a counterexaple of k steps to f . If [[M,¬f ]]k
is unsatisﬁable, then nothing can be said about the existence of counterexam-
ples to M |= f with higher bound. The typical technique is to generate and
solve [[M,¬f ]]k for increasing values of k, until either a counter-example is
found, or a given time-out is reached.
BMC is being increasingly accepted as practical technique, eﬀective in
particular in the process of falsiﬁcation, i.e. bug ﬁnding. The technique relies
on the use of eﬃcient SAT solvers (e.g., based on DPLL procedures [8]) for
checking the propositional satisﬁability of [[M,¬f ]]k. As shown in [7], BMC
avoids the blow-up in memory that can occur with model checking based on
Binary Decision Diagrams, and is therefore able to tackle much larger circuits.
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4.2 The encoding
Our approach to the veriﬁcation of hybrid automata is a generalization of
BMC for timed systems, as proposed in [3]. The approach reduces a BMC
problem for timed systems to the problem of deciding the satisﬁability of
math-formulas, i.e. boolean combinations of boolean variables and linear
(in)equalities over real variables, representing absolute time and clocks. The
resulting math-formulas are tackled with MathSAT [2,1], a solver combining
an eﬃcient DPLL procedure with mathematical constraint solvers of increasing
deductive power.
In the encoding for timed automata, boolean variables are used to encode
the discrete part of the system, while linear constraints on real variables en-
code the timed part. In particular, each location l is represented by a bitwise
encoding l, so that li holds if and only if the system is in the location li;
each synchronization event (channel, shared variable) is represented by a cor-
responding boolean variables; each switch is represented by a single boolean
variable (say, T ) which holds if and only if the system executes the correspond-
ing switch; a boolean variable Tδ, representing a continuous transition, holds
if and only if time elapses by some δ > 0; ﬁnally, for each process Pi, we intro-
duce a boolean variable T inull, that holds if and only if process Pi does nothing.
In order to deal with time, we introduce a real valued variable t representing
absolute time, and, for each clock x, a real valued variable ox representing
the diﬀerence with respect to absolute time. All mathematical constraints
required in the encoding are in the form v1 − v2  c, ∈ {≤,≥,=, >,<} v1
and v2 being real variables representing either absolute time or clock values.
The reader can refer to [3] for details.
We tackle the case of hybrid automata by considering that it is an extension
of the case of timed automata. The encoding for the timed case is extended
by introducing a set of real variables ωi’s, representing physical entities. To
simplify the notation, in the following we write: “∆t” for the diﬀerence t′ − t
between absolute time in the next and in the current state; “∆ω” for “ω′−ω”,
so that, e.g., we write “c ·∆t...” for “c · t′ − c · t...”; “∆ω = 0” for “ω′ = ω”,
“∆ω ≤ ...” for “ω′ ≤ ω + ...”. We also write “(w ∈ [t1, t2])” for “(w ≥
t1)∧ (w ≤ t2)”, where t1 and t2 are linear terms. If ψ is a formula, ψ′ denotes
the formula obtained by substituting in ψ each propositional variable pj with
p′j, and each real variable vi with v
′
i.
4.2.1 Initial conditions I(s(0)).
At step 0, in an initial location l, ω can either:
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• be set to a given initial value c0. If so, we represent this fact by the axiom:
l(0) → (ω(0) = c0); (1)
• be set nondeterministically to an initial value within a closed interval [a0, b0],
a0, b0 ∈ [−∞,∞]. 3 If so, we represent this fact by the axiom:
l(0) → (ω(0) ∈ [a0, b0]). (2)
4.2.2 Invariant conditions C(s).
For each location l equipped with the set {ψ1, ..., ψh} of invariants on real
valued variables, we include the axiom
l →
∧
j
ψj. (3)
4.2.3 Transition relation R(s, s′).
For each switch T equipped with a set {γ1, ..., γk} of guards and with a set
{θ1, ..., θm} of jump conditions on the real valued variables ωi’s and t, we
include the axioms
T →
∧
j
γj, (4)
T →
∧
j
θ′j (5)
respectively. For each physical variable ω that is not interested by a jump
condition of switch T , and must therefore keep its value, we add the axiom:
T → (∆ω = 0). (6)
When process i does nothing, in correspondence of T inull, each physical
variable ω maintains its value:
T inull → (∆ω = 0). (7)
When time elapses in a location l, physical variables ωi evolve according to
the set of variable dynamics {Ψ1, . . . ,Ψk} associated with l. For each location,
we add the axiom
(l ∧ Tδ) →
∧
i
Ψi (8)
Diﬀerent forms of variable dynamics are possible:
3 “a0 = −∞” and “b0 = −∞” mean that there is no lower bound and no upper bound for
ω respectively.
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• ω maintains its value under a dynamic of the form:
(l ∧ Tδ) → (∆ω = 0); (9)
• ω may evolve deterministically according to a linear function:
(l ∧ Tδ) → (∆ω = c ·∆t) (10)
c being a constant.
• ω may evolve nondeterministically within two linear functions:
ω′ ∈ [b1ω + c1 ·∆t− a1, b2ω + c2 ·∆t + a2], (11)
a1, a2 ≥ 0, b1, b2 ∈ {0, 1}, c1, c2 ∈ (−∞,∞). (12)
If a1 = a2 = 0, then (11) encodes a triangular constraint. If b1 = b2 = 0
and c1 = c2 = 0, then (11) encodes a rectangular constraint.
• in the general case, the evolution of the variables can be nondeterministic
within the space described by the linear inequalities {Ψ1, . . . ,Ψk}, as in
equation 8.
The encoding of properties basically follows the encoding in [3]. Our ap-
proach is bounded complete, in the following sense: if there exists a trace of
length k, then the encoding of length k is satisﬁable, and can be found by
running MathSAT on it. The undecidability of the class of hybrid automata
we are dealing with tells us that it is in general impossible to decide if a
counterexample might be found with bigger k, or if the problem is unsolvable.
5 Experimental Evaluation
We evaluated the potential of the approach by tackling an example of hybrid
systems of industrial relevance, i.e. the model of the SPS. The bounded reach-
ability method described in Section 4 can be used both for model debugging
(i.e., bug hunting) and for simulation of hybrid systems. In the following we
provide some hints about the use of our methodology by showing some experi-
mental results. For illustration purposes, we will discuss a simpliﬁed one-sided
model of the SPS case study, including one instance of the ME, GBX, VALVE,
ATSM, PTO and SPS computer components of Figure 1. Under this abstrac-
tion, the analogous components of the opposite side of the system are assumed
to be correctly working. An example of property to be checked is given by
(the negation of) the following formula:
(! GBX.loc broken & ! GBX.loc grippage & ! VALVE.loc stuck closed &
! ATSM.loc broken & ! PTO.loc fused) U GBX.sp gbx <= sg1 (P1)
This is a typical safety property expressed via the LTL until operator.
The intended semantics is whether there exists a path such that no failures of
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Time T0 :
Locations : no fail, gbx pto driven, atsm idle, sps ok, closed
Analog Variables : sp me = sm2, sp gbx = sg2, sp atsm = 0
Discrete Trans : me grippage
Synchronizations : none
Time T1 :
Locations : grippage, gbx pto driven, atsm idle, sps ok, closed
Analog Variables : sp me = sm5, sp gbx = sg3, sp atsm = 0
Discrete Trans : atsm inc a, sps inc a, valve open
Synchronizations : SPS and ATSM on inc a, SPS and VALVE on open
Time T2 :
Locations : grippage, gbx pto driven, atsm inc a, sps inc a, open
Analog Variables : sp me = sm6, sp gbx = sg4, sp atsm = sa2
Discrete Trans : atsm inc a inc b, sps inc a inc b
Synchronizations : SPS and ATSM on inc b
Time T3 :
Locations : grippage, gbx pto driven, atsm inc b, sps inc b, open
Analog Variables : sp me = sm7, sp gbx = sg1, sp atsm = sa3
Fig. 4. An example of MathSAT trace
the GBX, VALVE, ATSM and PTO components happen along the path, and
ﬁnally the speed of the gearbox (GBX component) drops below the constant
value sg1. The negation of the above property can be seen as a safety property
to be veriﬁed by the system (i.e., in presence of failures due only to the main
engine, the gearbox speed cannot drop below sg1). The rationale behind this
property is that the cross-bleed procedure initiated by the SPS computer (see
Section 2) is able to recover from an engine failure by using power coming
from the opposite engine (which is assumed to be working in this one-sided
model).
The property may or may not hold depending on the value chosen for the
constant sg1. In particular, if the value chosen for sg1 exceeds a given thresh-
old, the property is falsiﬁed by MathSAT (this means that the cross-bleed
procedure is not able to prevent the gearbox speed to drop below that par-
ticular value). In this case, MathSAT generates an output trace showing an
execution of the system which leads to the violation. The trace includes infor-
mation on the discrete transitions and the time elapse transitions taken by the
automata, the exact time delays and time points at which the transitions take
place, and the synchronization channels between diﬀerent automata. If the
value of the constant sg1 is chosen below a suitable threshold, property (P1)
holds, and therefore MathSAT correctly does not ﬁnd any counterexample.
Regarding the choice of the constant sg1, see the discussion in Section 7.
The trace generated by MathSAT is schematically shown in Figure 4.
For each time instant, the trace shows the current locations of the ME,
GBX, ATSM, and VALVE automata, the current values of the sp me, sp gbx,
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sp atsm analog variables, the discrete transitions which take place at that time
instant, and the synchronizations channels. For a better understanding of the
trace, in Figure 5 we show a simpliﬁed version of the SPS computer automaton
(only the part relevant to the simulation is shown). Notice that this automaton
shows as example of triangular constraint, i.e. sp gbx− sp atsm ≤ c1 [≥ c1],
and of communication with shared variables (variables sp gbx and sp atsm
model, respectively, the speed of the GBX and ATSM components).
The simulation begins at time T0, when an engine grippage takes place.
Both the engine and the gearbox speeds begin to decrease. At time T1, the
SPS computer detects a gearbox low speed condition, and therefore issues the
opening of the valve (the VALVE and SPS computer automata synchronize
on the open channel); as a result, the ATSM begins to increase its speed (SPS
and ATSM synchronize on the inc a channel). At time T2, the SPS computer
issues a change in the ATSM dynamics (SPS and ATSM synchronize on inc b).
The simulation stops at time T3, when the gearbox speed reaches the value
sg1.
The same approach can be used for guided simulation. To give an example,
we consider the following formula:
(! ME.loc eng flameout & ! GBX.loc broken & ! GBX.loc grippage &
! VALVE.loc stuck closed & ! ATSM.loc broken & ! PTO.loc fused)
U GBX.sp atsm >= sa1 (P2)
It is a variation of the previous reachability property, here we require that
at the end of the path the speed of the ATSM component is greater than the
constant value sa1. Furthermore, by explicitly ruling out an engine ﬂameout,
we limit the possible failure modes of the main engine to grippage. As ex-
plained in Section 2, in presence of an engine failure, the ATSM component is
responsible of carrying out the cross-bleed procedure, which consists in driv-
ing the gearbox with the pneumatic power coming from the valve. Correct
functioning of the cross-bleed procedure requires the ATSM (which is initially
idle) to start and bring up the gearbox speed. Using MathSAT, we are able
to reconstruct a trace corresponding to the above property, which illustrates
how the cross-bleed procedure is carried out. It is possible to tune the above
simulation and perform further ones by adding further constraints on the trace
to look for.
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Property P1 Property P2
k Time Σ Time Mem. Result Time Σ Time Mem. Result
2 0.06 0.06 5.6 UNSAT 0.10 0.10 5.5 UNSAT
3 0.20 0.26 6.2 UNSAT 0.16 0.26 6.0 UNSAT
4 0.53 0.79 7.1 UNSAT 0.30 0.56 6.8 UNSAT
5 1.81 2.60 7.7 UNSAT 0.49 1.05 7.5 UNSAT
6 6.49 9.09 8.4 UNSAT 0.84 1.89 8.2 UNSAT
7 4.53 13.62 8.9 SAT 1.53 3.42 8.8 UNSAT
8 2.88 6.30 9.4 UNSAT
9 4.94 11.24 10.0 UNSAT
10 8.69 19.93 10.7 UNSAT
11 8.88 28.81 11.3 SAT
Table 1
Experimental results (Time in seconds, Memory in MB)
The performance of our method on the examples described above are re-
ported in Table 1. For each problem length, we show computation time, total
computation time up to that problem instance, and memory usage. Com-
putation times include both parse and search time. The results have been
obtained on a Pentium III machine 1.0 GHz, with 256 Mb memory, running
Linux Redhat 7.1. The minimal length trace generated by MathSat for P1
has length 7, whereas the one generated for P2 has length 11.
We also attempted a comparison with HyTech [11], a state-of-the-art tool
for the analysis of hybrid systems. Diﬀerently from our approach, HyTech
is based on the calculation of the reachable state space, and is therefore not
limited to the bounded case. In principle, HyTech may not terminate when
tackling an undecidable class of automata (as in the case of the SPS).
We encoded the models of the SPS, as closely as possible, into HyTech.
Overﬂow errors in the underlying polyhedral libraries made it impossible for
HyTech to compute the space of reachable conﬁgurations beyond the 5th iter-
ation. We also attempted to use the -o1 and -o2 options, that are sometimes
able to limit such problems, but in our case obtained no eﬀect. From the
point of view of performance, the time required by HyTech to reach the 5th
iteration was 32 seconds, when run without options; the use of -o1 and -o2
required 50 and 86 seconds, respectively. The analysis is very preliminary, but
seems to suggest that there is a clear potential in our techniques.
6 Related Work
The work presented in this paper builds upon our previous work on timed
systems [3]. In [3], we showed how to reduce the problem of bounded model
checking for timed systems to the satisﬁability of a math-formula, which can
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then be checked by a SAT-solver. We also presented the MathSat solver [2,1],
an eﬃcient SAT-solver which is based on the integration of SAT techniques [4]
with some specialized decision procedures for linear mathematical constraints.
A work related to ours, but still limited to timed systems, is [17]. In the present
work, as explained in Section 4.2, we have extended the encoding in order to
deal with hybrid systems.
Our model for hybrid systems is closely related with the linear and rectan-
gular hybrid automata models presented in [10,13], the main diﬀerence being in
the deﬁnition of the dynamics of the real-valued variables. In [10], the dynam-
ics (called ﬂow conditions) of the real-valued variables are deﬁned by means
of linear constraints over the ﬁrst derivatives of such variables, whereas in our
model dynamics can be characterized by means of linear functions of the time
delay, which directly constrain the behaviour of the variables. This approach
is analogous to restricting the ﬂows of the real-valued variables to stay inside
a rectangular region, as in the rectangular automata model of [10]. In fact, as
noted in [12], under the hypothesis of working with convex linear constraints,
requiring the ﬂow to be inside a rectangular region amounts to requiring the
existence of a smooth function inside the corresponding piecewise-linear enve-
lope.
The model of hybrid I/O automata presented in [14] is general enough
to accommodate our model of hybrid automata. Discrete and continuous
communication are achieved by means of, respectively, shared actions and
shared variables. However, discrete events are not allowed to change the value
of shared variables, as in our case.
As an alternative approach to the veriﬁcation of hybrid systems, we cite
[15], where the CheckMate tool is presented. CheckMate performs veriﬁcation
of hybrid systems using ﬁnite-state approximations called quotient transition
systems. Although this approach is not restricted to linear hybrid automata,
the veriﬁcation analysis may be inconclusive, in which case a reﬁnement of the
current approximation may be attempted. An analysis of the current trends
in model checking of hybrid systems can be found in [16].
This line of research has been carried on inside the ESACS [6] project
(see http://www.esacs.org), an European-Union-sponsored project whose
main goals are to deﬁne a methodology and a shared environment to improve
the safety analysis practice for complex systems development. The Secondary
Power System [5] is one of the case-studies investigated in ESACS. One of the
main motivations for our research is the realization that the use of traditional
ﬁnite-state model checking, based on the discretization of real variables, has a
very hard time in dealing with the complexity of hybrid systems [5]. In fact,
the results may depend on the step of discretization, and the state explosion
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problem makes such an approach infeasible in practice.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we have addressed the problem of veriﬁcation of industrial
systems that are naturally modeled as linear hybrid automata. The approach
is an enhancement of the bounded model checking approach for timed systems
proposed in [3] to the case of linear hybrid automata. Eﬃciency is gained
by the use of the MathSAT solver. The main limitations are given by the
undecidability of the analyzed class, and the constraints on the linearity of
real variables dynamics. Despite this, however, the approach allows us to
model and analyze systems of practical relevance, that HyTech is currently
unable to deal with.
In the future, we will provide a more thorough experimental evaluation,
by enlarging both the set of tools we compare with (some of them are cited
in Section 6), and the set of case studies to analyze. Regarding the SPS ex-
ample, we plan to experiment with more complex models, at diﬀerent levels
of granularity and abstraction (e.g., a two-sided model of the system). We
will investigate how to optimize the MathSAT solver on these speciﬁc prob-
lems (e.g., by constraining the splitting variables in the style of [9,18]), and
will experiment with diﬀerent encodings. As a ﬁrst step towards bridging
the gap between bounded model checking and unbounded veriﬁcation, induc-
tive reasoning techniques to prove invariant properties will be investigated.
An important point we plan to address in the near future is concerned with
parametric analysis, which is currently supported in HyTech. To exemplify,
parametric analysis would allow us to replace the constant value sg1 in prop-
erty (P1) (see Section 5) with a parameter α in order to ﬁnd out constraints
on the parameter for which the property does or does not hold. Finally, in the
future we plan to extend the framework to properties expressed in full LTL.
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